The 'Knobe effect' is the name given to the empirical finding that judgments about whether an action is intentional or not seem to depend on the moral valence of this action. To account for this phenomenon, Scaife and Webber have recently advanced the 'Consideration Hypothesis', according to which people's ascriptions of intentionality are driven by whether they think the agent took the outcome in consideration when taking his decision. In this paper, I examine Scaife and Webber's hypothesis and conclude that it is supported neither by the existing literature nor by their own experiments, whose results I did not replicate, and that the 'Consideration Hypothesis' is not the best available account of the 'Knobe Effect'.
1 By "moral responsibility", I mean here the fact that the agent deserves praise or blame for what he has done. Thus, there is a difference in moral responsibility between the chairman in the Harm Case who deserves blame for having done something bad and the chairman in the Help Case who does not deserve praise for having done something good. 2 Note that in Hindriks and Sripada's accounts of the 'Knobe Effect', intentionality judgments depend on the agent's moral attitudes (what he thinks to be morally right or wrong). However, both Hindriks and Sripada insist that this claim should not be confused with the claim that participants' moral evaluations influence their intentionality judgments. For this reason (i.e. because they think that ascriptions of intentionality do not depend on participants' moral evaluations), both accounts can be adequately described as rejecting Knobe's thesis that intentionality judgments are influenced by evaluative considerations. 3 Scaife and Webber's hypothesis should not be confused with a close kind of account, according to which a side-effect is intentional if the agents considered he had reason not to bring it about (Turner 2004; Hindriks 2008; Machery 2008) . For example, Turner (2004) suggests that a side-effect is intentional if (i) the agent was aware that his action was likely to cause this side-effet, (ii) bringing about the side-effect counts against acting from the agent's perspective, and (iii) the agent does not try to prevent the side-effect from occurring. This theory and CH make very different predictions. For example, what if the chairman in the Help Case rejoiced about helping the environment rather than saying 'I don't care'? Turner should predict that helping the environment would still be judged unintentional, while Scaife and Webber should predict that this side-effect would be judged rather intentional (because such rejoicing would show that the chairman took the side-effect into consideration. Empirical evidence (Wible 2009; Cova and Naar forthcoming-b) suggests that CH's prediction is the right one.
Evaluation Hypothesis' (EEH) and the 'Action Evaluation Hypothesis' (AEH). Though it might well be that EEH, AEH and CH are not the best theories available, I will not introduce other theories in the competition, for it will be enough for my purposes to show that there is at least one theory that fares better than CH.
The 'Effect Evaluation Hypothesis' (EEH)
EEH is a family of hypotheses according to which the main factor in the 'Knobe effect' is the difference in the side effect's moral valence (whether it is good or bad). However, though the various versions of EEH accord themselves to make the normative valence of the side-effect the key factor in explaining the 'Knobe effect', it is worth noting that (i) they do not consider that the side-effect's valence is the only factor people consider in ascribing intentionality and (ii) that they consider that the agent's mental states are also taken into consideration. The different role they give to the agent's mental states might even constitute the key difference between the various versions of EEH.
In this paper, I will focus on the more recent version of this view put forward by Joshua Knobe (2010; Pettit and Knobe 2009) . Knobe considers that the valence of the side effect plays a role in setting up a 'default point' to which the agent's pro-attitude towards the side-effect will be compared. Indeed, according to Knobe, we judge that an agent A intentionally brought about an outcome O only if A's pro-attitudes towards O are beyond and above a given 'default point'. Moral evaluations play a crucial role in setting up this default point:
The central claim will be that people's moral judgments affect their intuitions by shifting the position of the default. For morally good action, the default is to have some sort of pro-attitude, whereas for morally bad actions, the default is to have some sort of con-attitude.
Thus, in the Harm Case, we consider that the default is to be opposed to harming the environment because we judge harming the environment to be a bad thing. But the chairman is indifferent to harming the environment, which makes him more prone to harm the environment than if he was opposed: his attitudes towards harming the environment are above the default point, and thus he intentionally harms the environment (see Figure 1) . Conversely, in the Help Case, the default is to be apt to help the environment, and the indifferent chairman is below that threshold; this is why his helping the environment is judged unintentional (see The important point is that this new version of Knobe's theory does not explain intentionality judgments solely by the side effect's moral valence; the agent's attitudes also come into play.
For example, if the side effect is bad but the agent's attitudes are very opposed to it (because the agent was forced to bring it about and brings it regretfully), this theory predicts that the action will be judged unintentional, though it is morally bad.
Because this sort of details is very important in assessing the explanatory power of a hypothesis, I won't compare here the Consideration Hypothesis to EEH in general. Rather, I
will focus on this particular version of EEH. From now on, I will use 'EEH' to refer to this particular hypothesis.
The 'Action Evaluation Hypothesis' (AEH)
While EEH is the hypothesis according to which ascriptions of intentionality are driven by differences in the side effect's moral valence (whether it is good or bad), AEH is the hypothesis according to which ascriptions of intentionality are driven by differences in the agent's moral responsibility (whether he deserves praise/blame or not).
Here, I will focus on Nadelhoffer's version of AEH (Nadelhoffer 2004a (Nadelhoffer , 2006 , that is the hypothesis according to which a side-effect is intentional to the extent that its moral valence (good or bad) matches the moral valence of the mental states that motivated it (that is, mental states for which the agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy).
Having specified the nature of CH's competitors, I will now compare Scaife and Webber's CH to Knobe's EEH and Nadelhoffer's AEH. I will argue that, in most cases, CH fares less well than EEH and AEH. 'people see Machery's Joe as deciding that the smoothie is worth the extra dollar on this occasion, but as not even considering the value of the free cup'.
Does the
Nevertheless, this argument is far from sufficient to establish the superiority of CH, for EEH and AEH can account for these cases once the following problem is noticed: it is possible that most people consider that paying the extra-dollar constitutes a means rather than a side-effect (Phelan and Sarkissian 2009). Since people naturally tend to consider means as more intentional than side-effects (Cova and Naar forthcoming-b), then EEH and AEH do not have to account for the difference between the two cases.
Thus, the fact that CH can provide an explanation of Machery's cases is not sufficient to ground its explanatory superiority. For all other cases surveyed by Scaife and Webber 5 ), EEH and AEH also have an explanation -so that there seems to be nothing in the literature cited by Scaife and Webber in favor of the superiority of CH.
Now, I will argue that existing data provide us good reasons to think that CH has a lower explanatory power than the other hypotheses.
The impact of participants' moral beliefs
A first set of findings that can be opposed to CH are studies suggesting that participants' These data can easily be accommodated by EEH which considers the agent's attitude towards the side effect as a crucial factor for intentionality attributions. They also can be accommodated by AEH: although I did not test for it, it is likely that a regretful agent will receive less blame than an agent who shows no regret for his bad action. But I do not think that CH can account for them, as there is no relation here between intentionality judgments and whether the agent was perceived as having taken the side effect into consideration 7 .
However, one might object that our measures of consideration are problematic. For example, a reviewer suggested that perhaps the Consideration and Reasons questions are not adequate measures, for they might be interpreted by participants as bearing only on good reasons and consideration. Thus, it might be that participants attribute more consideration and reasons in the No Regret condition but do not report them, thinking they are only asked about the good reasons.
To test for this alternative hypothesis, I designed a third version of the Pond case:
Pond (Hate):
Al said to Ann: "You know, if you fill in that pond in the empty lot next to your house, you're going to make the kids who look for frogs there very sad."Ann replied: "I know. But that's all the more reason to fill the pond! Those little brats always annoyed me! Anyway, the pond is a breeding ground for against acting (or both at the same time), it makes sense to sum questions 4 and 5 to have a measure of whether the side-effect was perceived as a consequence likely to be taken into consideration by Ann. 7 One objection might be that Ann in the No Regret case is in fact perceived as intending to make the kids sad and that is the reason why his action is judged more intentional. However, I have direct measures for this hypothesis: participants' answers to Question 4 ('Did Ann consider the fact that it would make the kids sad a reason to fill the pond?') Clearly, if Ann is perceived as intending to make the kids sad, then she will also be mosquitoes; and because I own the lot, I am responsible for it. It must be filled in." Ann filled in the pond, and, sure enough, the kids were very sad.
The procedure was the same than for the two previous scenarios: 30 participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk read this scenario and answered the same five questions. seems that participants did not give these questions a normative interpretation, and that they really judged that Ann did not take the side-effect into consideration in the No Regret case, though most of them judge that she intentionally made the kids sad.
Scaife and Webber's experiments
However, Scaife and Webber do not rely only on already existing data: they also produce new experiments in support of their hypothesis. Do these experiments really support CH by providing results that only CH is able to explain? If so, maybe that will be enough to counterbalance the difficulties I have previously mentioned.
Scaife and Webber first experiment
perceived as considering making the kids sad as a reason to fill the pond. Overall, I found no significant difference between the two cases for this question (in fact, ratings tended to be higher in the Regret case). 8 For comparison, the mean answer to Question 3 for the Regret case was 2.9 (SD=2.07). Thus, it doesn't seem that people tend to report less bad reasons than good reasons. As can be seen in Table 2 , there was no question for which I found a significant difference between the two cases. Thus, the two main assumptions of Scaife and Webber's argument are ungrounded: introducing a second side-effect does not reduce intentionality rating and does not make participants less likely to perceive the agent as taking the side-effect into consideration. Correlations do not lend much more support to CH: although there's a marginally significant correlation between intentionality and consideration ratings, I found a much greater and more significant correlation between intentionality and badness and blame ratings, which makes respectively EEH and AEH in better positions.
Nevertheless, there is something very puzzling in these results: although Scaife and
Webber found that most participants considered increasing the pollution as not intentional, I
found the reverse pattern of answers, with most participants considering increasing the pollution as intentional. For the case with two side effects, 58% of participants gave an answer above 4. Thus, I even failed to replicate Scaife and Webber's own results 9 .
Scaife and Webber's second experiment
Nevertheless, Scaife and Webber have a second experiment in support of their hypothesis.
They used the following case:
Parent (Original Scenario):
The doctor said to the parent: 'although your daughter is no longer showing any symptoms, we could run some tests to ensure that it won't recur; but the tests are painful, so it's up to you'.
9 I tried to replicate Scaife and Webber's results in two other experiments: one similar to the one described here and the other in which participants were asked only the intentionality question and had to answer only by YES or NO. In both cases, I found no difference between the two cases and observed that more than half of the participants judged the side effect to be intentional.
After some consideration, the parent said: 'the tests should be run, to be on the safe side'. And so the tests were run.
Did the parent intentionally inflict pain on the child?
In this case, they found that 66.3% of the participants judged that the parent had intentionally inflicted pain on the child. They use these results as an argument against AEH: clearly, we wouldn't blame the parent for having the tests run, so blame attribution cannot account for these results. From the perspective of EEH, these results are also a bit puzzling; clearly, the parent is perceived as acting reluctantly, as he is forced to have the tests run 10 . So, we shouldn't observe high intentionality ratings like these. On the contrary, CH can easily explain these data, as it is clear that the parent took into consideration the fact that having the tests run will harm his daughter, and this is why his action is judged intentional.
To test for this explanation, I designed a similar case, in which the parent does not take time to consider the side-effect of their action:
Parent (Fast Decision):
The doctor said to the parent: "although your daughter is no longer showing any symptoms, we could run some tests to ensure that it won't recur; but the tests are painful, so it's up to you".
Without taking time to think about it, the parent immediately answers: 'I don't care about the pain, the tests should be run'. And so the tests were run.
10 When I say that the parent is forced, I do not deny that he has the possibility to refuse the tests. I just want to say that he has compelling reasons to accept the test even though he would prefer the child not to suffer. Table 3 . Means (with Standard Deviations) and Correlations with Intentionality Judgments for the replication of Scaife and Webber's second experiment
As can be seen in Table 3 , manipulation was successful and participants were indeed less likely to consider that the agent took the side-effect into consideration in the Fast Decision condition. Nevertheless, intentionality ratings didn't decrease accordingly, in contrast with what CH would have predicted. On the contrary, they (non-significantly) tended to be higher in the case without consideration. This lack of relationship between consideration and intentionality attributions is highlighted by the lack of correlation between answers to the first two questions.
In a more problematic way, I was unable to replicate Scaife and Webber's results:
while they found that most participants judged the action intentional, the intentionality ratings I gathered are pretty low. To the intentionality question, only 10% of participants gave an answer above 4, while 73% gave "1" as answer. This contrasts with the higher ratings to the consideration question, with 53% of participants giving an answer above 4, and only 13%
giving "1" as answer.
These results are easily explained by EEH (because it is easy to perceive the parent as being forced to inflict pain on his daughter) and AEH (because of the strong correlation between intentionality and blame ratings). But CH seems unable to explain why we find low intentionality ratings for a case with high consideration ratings 11 .
Assessing the Consideration Hypothesis' explanatory power
How could CH be defended against the results presented in this paper? A first possibility is to emphasize what Scaife and Webber already mentioned in their paper: that it is not possible to directly measure whether people attribute 'consideration' to the agent. Given that 'consideration' can be understood in various ways, it is possible that when participants answer that the agent took the outcome into consideration, they only mean that he merely acknowledged its existence, without integrating it into his deliberation. For this reason, we couldn't rely on participants' answers to the 'consideration question', because it would be impossible to know if they reflect the relevant meaning of 'consideration'. For the same reason, the 'reasons questions' could not help us either, as participants could at the same time consider that the agent considered the side-effect as a reason against acting but did not take it into consideration during his deliberation. In conclusion, the correlation I found could not be used as an argument against CH, because we cannot exactly know what these questions measure.
11 Following this failure, I once again tried to replicate Scaife and Webber's results in two other experiments: one similar to the one described here and the other in which participants were asked only the intentionality question and had to answer only by YES or NO. In both cases, I observed that more than half of participants judged the side effect not to be intentional.
This line of answers strikes me as quite implausible, for two reasons. The first reason is that it seems to me that the same counter-argument cannot be used against the 'regret question': clearly, if one regrets having to do X to do Y and knows that bringing about Y will cause X, it is clear that one will consider X as a reason not to do Y and will give X some thought when deliberating about whether doing Y or not.
The second reason is that this line of answers cannot account for the fact that, in my experiments, answers to the 'consideration question' varied exactly as we would have expected if these answers reflected attributions of 'consideration' in the sense relevant to Scaife and Webber's hypothesis. For example, in the Pond cases, I found higher answers to the 'consideration question' when the agent expressed more regret. And in the Parent cases, I
found lower ratings when the parent answered quickly and declared that he didn't care. If participants really understood the terms 'taking into consideration' in a sense that is not the one relevant to CH but equivalent to 'acknowledging' or 'thinking about', why did I observe these variations? It seems much more plausible to think that participants' answers track 'consideration' in the sense that is relevant to CH, at least to some extent.
But, let's grant that my measures of 'consideration' are not reliable. Does it mean that my argument against CH collapse? Not at all. For if Scaife and Webber refuse all possibility to ask people about how much consideration they attribute to the agent, they must acknowledge that there is at least another way to guess how much consideration participants will attribute -some kind of a priori guess. For, if there is no way of determining how much consideration participants attribute (either by measures or by a priori guess), then there will be no way of determining what their intentionality attributions will be. Thus, if there is no way of determining (at least in some cases) how much consideration participants will attribute, then CH cannot make any prediction. And a theory that cannot make any prediction has clearly a very low explanatory power.
So, does CH fare better when we use our own intuitions and 'common sense' to predict how much consideration participants will attribute? I don't think so. It rather seems plausible to think that people will be more likely to attribute consideration to a regretful agent (in the Pond cases) and to a parent who takes time to think rather than shrug his shoulders and say 'I don't care' (in the Parent cases). But in all these cases, intentionality ratings varied contrary to what CH would predict on this basis.
Maybe Scaife and Webber could say that I'm wrong and that it is not that clear that regretful or caring agents will be more likely to give consideration to the side effects of their actions. So, let's consider the following case, a variation on a case by Knobe and Kelly In this case, I think it is clear that the terrorist gave some importance to the fact that defusing the bomb would save the Americans (after all, he intended to kill them). Also, it seems clear that participants will attribute consideration to the terrorist in the relevant sense. Thus, CH should predict that participants will answer that the terrorist intentionally saved the Americans.
I gave this scenario to 30 participants through the Amazon Mechanical Turk. Age mean was 29.2 and 7 were women. Participants only had to answer the intentionality question in a binary way ('YES' or 'NO') 12 . Only 7 participants (23%) gave the 'YES' answer (as would predict EEH, AEH and IDH). Thus, it seems that CH's predictions are false. Now, there are two ways of reacting to these results. One is simply to consider that CH is false. The other is to argue for CH by saying that maybe the participants didn't attribute consideration to the terrorist. But if it is impossible to guess whether participants will attribute consideration, even in cases as clear and evident as Terrorist, and if it is impossible to measure whether participants attribute consideration, then CH cannot make any prediction.
Given that the other hypotheses can make predictions, and that some of these predictions do work, this line of response inevitably lead to the conclusion that CH should be abandoned.
Thus, for CH to be a legitimate hypothesis, its defendants must grant that there is at least a legitimate way to predict how much consideration participants will attribute.
Considering only the cases in which it seemed to me that both answers to the consideration question and guessing on a priori grounds clearly led to the same predictions about the consideration participants will attribute, I compared the respective merits of each hypothesis in Table 4 , I calculated a score representing the explanatory power of each hypothesis:
'++' was equivalent to 1 point, '+' to 0 point, and '-' to -1. The final score are 4 for EEH, 4
for AEH, and -1 for CH. So, contrary to what Scaife and Webber claimed, it seems that CH is far from having the best explanatory power (at least for the cases I examined here).
To sum up, I argued in this paper that Scaife and Webber's claims about CH being the best hypothesis for the Knobe effect is not warranted. The 'Consideration Hypothesis' is unsupported both by the current state of the literature and Scaife and Webber's own experiments. In most of the cases I presented here, the 'Consideration Hypothesis' was the less powerful hypothesis. As a result, I conclude that we have no compelling reason to endorse CH.
